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The Italian government will present its public ﬁnance projections by 10 April. Lorenzo Codogno
writes that ﬁscal policy is expected to be strongly expansionary in 2016, but courtesy of ﬂexibility
clauses, the government will likely avoid entering into the EU’s so called ‘Excessive Deﬁcit
Procedure’ in May. He argues however that a ﬁscal problem looms large in 2017, while Italy’s
reduction of its debt-to-GDP ratio remains fragile and subject to external shocks.
By 10 April, the Italian government will unveil its budgetary projections (Economic and Financial
Document – the DEF – which includes the Stability Programme to be delivered to Brussels). It will
indicate new projections for economic growth and public ﬁnances and will set the stage for the preparation of the
Budget to be delivered in October. Table 1 shows the key ﬁgures the government presented back in September
2015 and, in brackets, the European Commission Winter forecasts.
Table 1: Italy’s key macroeconomic and public ﬁnance projections
Note: Projections from the Update to the Economic and Financial Document presented on 18
September 2015 and, in brackets, European Commission Winter Forecasts; in bold actual or
preliminary ﬁgures. Structural balance is cyclically-adjusted and net of one-oﬀs. Cyclically-
adjusted primary balance is gross of support to other Eurozone countries and payment in
arrears of the public administration.
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The government also asked for an extra 0.2pp of GDP ﬂexibility to deal with the migration crisis, which is not
included in the September projections; otherwise, the net borrowing for 2016 would have moved from 2.2% to 2.4%
of GDP. Please note that estimates of potential growth, output gap, and the structural balance tend to ﬂuctuate
widely, as can be seen in the table (Italian government vs Commission using the same methodology), but
compliance with EU ﬁscal rules will be checked exclusively against the European Commission’s Spring Forecasts to
be published on 4 May 2016.
Key forecast revisions: will they matter?
Back in September 2015, the government projected GDP growth at 1.6% in both 2016 and 2017. In February, the
European Commission’s more recent Winter Forecasts projected 1.4% and 1.3% respectively. Given the soft 2015
ending (i.e. 0.1% quarter on quarter), which led to a lower carry-over into 2016 (0.2%), and a likely slight downward
revision in exogenous variables, the European Commission’s projections will likely be around 1.1%, or even 1.0%,
for 2016 and possibly a bit stronger for 2017 (1.2-1.3%).
Government projections are going to be slightly more positive (my guess is 1.2% and 1.4% respectively). In March,
Consensus Forecasts called for GDP growth at 1.1% in 2016 (see Figure 1) and 1.3% in 2017. There is probably
some upside potential for 2016 linked to a likely rebound in 1Q16 GDP, and I would not be surprised to see a better
outcome (1.4%), but there are also downside risks related to the global scenario.
Figure 1: Italy’s GDP projections for 2016 (Consensus Forecasts)
Source:Consensus Forecasts 7 March 2016
2016: the government is likely to get the go-ahead from Brussels
Italy will likely manage to avoid the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure in 2016. The decision is due by the end of May
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based on Commission forecasts to be published on 4 May. Let me brieﬂy highlight why this is likely to be the case.
In July 2015, the European Council already approved ﬂexibility for structural reforms by reducing the required
structural adjustment for 2016 to 0.1pp of GDP. On top of that, the government asked for another 0.1pp in
September (to make for 0.5pp, the maximum allowed for structural reforms) and 0.3pp for public investments.
Another 0.2pp was added oﬀ the cuﬀ, not included in baseline projections, for extra costs linked to the immigration
crisis (as it would be a one-oﬀ, this extra ﬂexibility would not change the required structural adjustment). Stretching
ﬂexibility to the limits, the Italian government presented projections that called for a worsening of the structural
balance by 0.4pp in 2016, and then a gradual adjustment thereafter (0.4pp in 2017 and 0.3pp in 2018 in structural
terms), writing in oﬃcial documents that it would be “counterproductive” to do anything more.
Back in September, there was still uncertainty as to whether ﬂexibility clauses could add up, i.e., ﬂexibility for
reforms, plus those for investments and possibly for the immigration crisis. At the time, the prevailing interpretation
was indeed that they could add up. The Commission Communication of 13 January 2015 on ﬂexibility within the
Stability and Growth Pact said that “under the preventive arm of the Pact, some investments deemed to be
equivalent to major structural reforms may, under certain conditions, justify a temporary deviation from the MTO of
the concerned Member State from the adjustment path towards it”.
The General Secretariat of the Council published a note on “Commonly agreed position on Flexibility in the Stability
and Growth Pact” on 30 November 2015, which presented the position agreed upon at the Economic and Financial
Committee, the junior Committee of Ecoﬁn, as a result of discussions on the operationalisation of the Commission
Communication. The document clariﬁed how three speciﬁc policy dimensions can best be taken into account when
applying rules: (i) cyclical conditions; (ii) structural reforms; and (iii) “government investments aiming at, ancillary to,
and economically equivalent to major structural reforms”.
The note indicated what types of reforms would qualify for budget ﬂexibility and that they have to be “major”, have
“long-term positive budgetary eﬀects” and be “fully implemented”. Italy’s reforms should not have problems
qualifying, although arguments need to be fully spelled out in the forthcoming DEF. Flexibility is granted provided
that: (i) the reforms meet the criteria, (ii) the temporary deviation does not exceed 0.5% of GDP, (iii) the cumulative
temporary deviation granted under the structural reform clause and the investment clause does not exceed 0.75% of
GDP, eﬀectively putting a ceiling on possible ﬂexibility.
Moreover, ﬂexibility can be allowed only if the output gap is greater than 1.5% in the year of application, i.e., 2016 for
Italy. Italy would be a borderline case as the Winter Forecasts of the Commission show 1.5%. Still, with a small
downward revision in GDP projections for the current year (and possibly a marginal increase in potential growth
following technical discussions on the lengthening of the forecast horizon), Italy should make it.
Finally, ﬂexibility is conditional on Italy’s pursuit of structural balances leading to the MTO within the time horizon of
the Stability Programme. In the Commission opinion on Italy’s Draft Budgetary Plan published on 16 November
2015, Italy was considered “at risk of non-compliance with the requirements for 2016 under the SGP. [Italy’s
Budgetary Plan] might result in a signiﬁcant deviation from the adjustment paths towards the Medium-Term
Objective (MTO).”
Assuming that all the above (and other things I have not mentioned) are respected, Italy’s structural balance would
still be allowed to deteriorate by only 0.25pp in 2016, while the Winter Forecasts of the Commission would call for an
increase of the structural deﬁcit by 0.7pp. As there is a margin (“signiﬁcant deviation”) in the Commission
assessment of 0.25%, this leaves a gap of 0.2pp, barring no major changes due to the lower economic projections.
This gap matches press leaks related to an additional ﬁscal correction the Commission requested from the Italian
government for the current year. The government has already said that it will use “administrative measures” instead
of a supplementary budget to close the gap, with some extra savings on interest expenditures, unused funds
already allotted, voluntary disclosure, and so on. The bottom line is that Italy will likely make it, but only just. The
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ﬁnal decision will be made by the end of May.
2017: a high mountain to climb
To be fair, I have never seen an easy year in my nine years at the Italian Treasury and 2017 will be no easier than in
the past. It is no wonder that Italy is trying to team up with other countries to ask for a revision of the methodology
for estimating potential growth and the output gap, which would provide some extra leeway.
According to the more recent Winter Forecasts of the Commission, the output gap for 2017 was estimated at -0.3%,
requiring a structural correction of more than 0.5, i.e., at least 0.6pp (see Figure 2). The ﬁscal adjustment required
for 2017 will be frozen once the 2016 Spring Forecasts (t-1) are out. As it appears likely that the estimated output
gap will be smaller than 1.5, the required structural adjustment will deﬁnitely be 0.6pp. Any possible methodology
revision, including a potential lengthening of the forecast horizon, is unlikely to close such a gap, even assuming it
becomes eﬀective immediately, in time for the Spring Forecasts.
On top of this required adjustment, the government needs to repeal a previously legislated VAT hike – a safeguard
clause automatically increasing VAT should adequate spending cuts not be legislated. This was a way to make the
commitment credible, allowing deﬁcit projections to include the results and thus respect ﬁscal rules. These
safeguard clauses amount to 15.1bn, i.e., 0.9% of GDP for 2016 (4.4bn for 2018), and should ideally be addressed
only through spending cuts.
My back-of-the-envelope estimate of budgetary measures required for 2017 to comply with ﬁscal rules call for
0.3/0.4pp of GDP in extra structural adjustment to reach the required 0.6pp correction. Including safeguard clauses,
this makes for a gap of about 1.2/1.3% of GDP that needs to be ﬁnanced in October. Finally, the Prime Minister has
made yet-to-be-ﬁnanced promises to reduce taxation and introduce a €500 bonus for young people. The reduction
of IRAP, the local tax for companies, is already ﬁnanced but nothing else is. It is diﬃcult to estimate how much the
total bill will be.
In the past, some of the spending cuts were set aside. Tax expenditure in particular proved to be a very diﬃcult
political subject. It is not clear whether the government will promise to reduce tax expenditures in the next Budget to
help ﬁnance the large ﬁscal gap. It seems encouraging that it set up a working group tasked with delivering
proposals for the Budget, although I am somewhat suspicious of working groups when the problem is political. As an
example, reducing tax expenditures would imply eliminating tax beneﬁts on fuel for lorry drivers, tax beneﬁts for
agriculture, and subsidies for newspapers, which are all very touchy political issues.
The Italian government will try to do whatever it can to reduce the overall structural adjustment in 2017, but ﬂexibility
clauses can no longer be invoked. The mentioned note by the General Secretariat of the Council says that “the
application of the structural reform clause is restricted to a single time per period of adjustment towards the MTO,
i.e., Italy will not be allowed to beneﬁt from the clause again until it has attained its MTO. This provision is not
designed to restrict structural reforms, of course, but to keep the MTO from becoming a moving target.
Italy should move from a Commission-estimated structural deﬁcit of 1.7% (likely to become 1.5%) to 0.0% within the
timeframe of the Stability Programme. This eﬀectively means that Italy should reduce its structural deﬁcit from 1.7%
to 1.5% for the current year (as required by the Commission and leaked in newspapers) and that the targets for the
following years should be 0.9%, 0.3%, and 0.0%, decreasing by 0.6pp per year until MTO is met.
The matrix in Figure 2 speciﬁes the ﬁscal adjustment requirements under the preventive arm of the Pact. The matrix
is symmetric and aims at requiring larger ﬁscal eﬀorts in better times and smaller ﬁscal eﬀorts under diﬃcult
economic conditions.
Figure 2: Matrix for required annual ﬁscal adjustment in structural terms (% of GDP)
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Source: General Secretariat of the Council, “Commonly agreed position on Flexibility in the
Stability and Growth Pact”, 30 November 2015. “Sustainability risk” in the matrix refers to the
medium-term overall debt sustainability as measured by the S1 indicator, among other
information. S1 is deﬁned as the adjustment eﬀort required, in terms of steady improvement
in the structural primary balance to be introduced until 2020 and then sustained for a decade,
to bring the debt ratios to 60% of GDP in 2030, also taking into account the costs arising
from an ageing population.
There is a crack in everything, that’s how the light gets in
Over the past couple of years, there has been a restless search for ‘cracks’ in the EU ﬁscal framework. Flexibility
clauses, and relevant factors have been sought out to reduce the burden of adjustment and allow economic growth
to strengthen, i.e., allow ‘light to get in’ after the dark period of deep ﬁscal consolidation between 2012-2014. Why
does the Italian government strenuously oppose more ﬁscal consolidation?
The ﬁrst reason is that, according to the Italian government, returning to a restrictive ﬁscal policy is wrong from an
economic point of view. In a world suﬀering from aggregate demand deﬁciency, given the diﬃculty of central banks
to do more to support it, fully enforcing European rules would risk derailing Italy’s feeble recovery. For example,
spending cuts are important for reassessing the way in which the state provides services to citizens, but they have a
high multiplier and negatively aﬀect economic growth in the near term. In addition, the calls of the G20 and the
European Central Bank for governments to “do their part” would seem to indicate the need for a diﬀerent ﬁscal
policy. True, structural reforms may at times be costly in the near term, but I do not think this was the main reason
Italy searched for ﬂexibility.
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In September, the planning document included a review of the literature on ﬁscal multipliers. Spending cuts have the
highest multiplier eﬀect on the economy, and the underlying message was that reducing projected spending cuts
would allow aggregate demand to strengthen. Flexibility is a way to smoothly reduce high-multiplier expenditures
while somewhat reducing taxation at the same time.
Thinking that achieving a more accommodative ﬁscal stance should be the primary policy aim and that Italy can
solve its structural problems with an expansionary ﬁscal policy as a facilitator for structural reforms may prove a big
mistake. Countries that can aﬀord it should deﬁnitely take a less restrictive or even expansionary policy to contribute
to Euro Area aggregate demand, but Italy can only continue the consolidation process. Supporting domestic demand
as the primary goal may even prolong the structural problems and pose a risk to ﬁnancial stability.
There is also a second, more political objection. With the opposition increasingly radicalised, Eurosceptic and
populist, Renzi seems to say (and perhaps rightly): “there is no alternative to my government”. To avoid any risk,
Renzi has adopted an increasingly confrontational stance with Europe and a more populist stance in budgetary
matters. There is no other justiﬁcation for measures such as the famous “80 euro” to households, the recent
abolition of the TASI (the recurrent taxation on ﬁrst residencies) and the €500 cheque for Italian youth. Moreover, the
government set aside some of the most thorny and delicate questions on the spending review, essentially all that
could cause political and electoral damage in the short term.
Lobbies, vested interests, and rent-seekers form a hard amalgam to crack, even for a young, dynamic leader eager
to deliver. Moreover, as often happens, pursuing the common good with reforms does not lead to immediate returns,
not only in terms of growth and employment but also in electoral terms.
Can the debt-to-GDP ratio be reduced soon?
Reducing the very high debt-to-GDP ratio is very challenging for Italy, especially in a low-inﬂation environment and
with the legacy of the crisis on the cost of servicing the debt.
In 2015, the Italian economy grew in real terms by 0.8% and 1.5% at current prices, with the latter being more
important for the debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics. The result was driven by an unusually high GDP deﬂator (0.8%)
compared to broadly ﬂat consumer prices. The GDP deﬂator has in fact beneﬁted from the collapse of the deﬂator of
imports (-2.7%) due to the decline in prices of imported energy products. With this result and with net borrowing at
2.6% the debt-to-GDP ratio almost stabilised (132.6% compared to 132.5% the previous year).
In 2016, nominal GDP growth would likely be below last year’s result, assuming a ﬂat deﬂator as the eﬀect of
declining oil prices is fading while the eﬀect of monetary policy will take a while to do its magic (somewhat oddly, the
Commission indicated 0.8% in February). The European Commission projects net borrowing at 2.5% for 2016. Even
if the government reduces it to 2.3% with administrative measures, it would be diﬃcult to project a debt-to-GDP ratio
below last year’s levels. The reduction will likely start in 2017 and the following years but at a pace that leaves Italy
exposed to a sudden increase in interest rates or an unexpected downturn in the global economy.
Interest expenditure still accounts for close to 4.0% of GDP, well above the Eurozone’s (Figure 3 and Figure 4). The
implicit cost of debt ﬁnancing is still higher than the Eurozone’s and the gap is not closing. This is partly due to the
long duration of debt. While reducing reﬁnancing risk, this also prevents a quicker decline in the cost of borrowing
when interest rates decline. The other reason is that the expensive bonds issued during the crisis in 2011-2013 will
remain in the portfolio for a number of years, thereby keeping the average implicit cost high. As a result, the gap with
the Eurozone remains wide.
Yet, Italy has used lower interest rates as a way to deliver ﬁscal consolidation. In fact, the cyclically adjusted primary
balance has declined from close to 4.0% in 2014 to 2.4% in 2016. The cyclically adjusted primary balance (or the
structural primary balance) is probably a better measure than the structural balance to assess the true ﬁscal eﬀort.
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In this situation, there is clearly a need to reduce the stock of debt as soon as possible. Speeding up the disposal of
remaining state-owned stakes in major companies would be a possible option. The government may announce the
disposal of another stake (probably 30%) in Poste Italiane. Yet, not many assets are left at the central level and the
privatisation process at the local level is still painfully slow. Reducing the stock of debt by 0.5% of GDP each year
with the privatisation process, as targeted in the latest oﬃcial projections, seems very ambitious. As a result, there is
no silver bullet other than bringing the cyclically adjusted primary balance back to 4.0% as soon as possible.
Figure 3: Italy’s interest payments as % of GDP
Source: European Commission, Winter Forecasts, February 2016
Figure 4: Italy’s implicit ﬁnancing costs
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Source: European Commission, Winter Forecasts, February 2016
The bottom line
My guess is that the government will manage to pass the exam in May, but the situation will become increasingly
tricky for 2017. Without bold actions to reduce current expenditures, the consolidation eﬀort is unlikely to deliver a
sustainable reduction in labour taxation and an increase in public investments. Complying with EU ﬁscal rules and
speeding up the reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio will be very diﬃcult and the process will remain fragile and
subject to external shocks.
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